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A wide range of activities is involved in the application of Explosive Detection Sys-
tems (EDS) and the fi elded use of such instruments. The right steps must be taken 
to bring an instrument into operation if it is to be of value. A reconsideration of 
the process is needed because terrorist methods and types of target are changing. 
Aviation has, for a long time, been regarded as especially vulnerable, since a small 
bomb can down an aircraft carrying hundreds of people. There are many examples 
of terrorist attacks on aircraft and airports and this makes aviation security a pri-
ority of most governments. It is in the airport that one is most likely to see an EDS 
in use.  Of recent years, attacks on other forms of mass transportation have been 
seen, such as in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and in London on 7 July 2005, and on 
non-transportation targets such as government buildings, places of entertainment, 
restaurants, shopping centres and open-air markets. Each of these environments 
has different characteristics, such as throughput, number of alighting and joining 
points, baggage handling methods, shape of facilities and feasible geometrical 
confi guration for inspection. Methods traditionally used for aviation will have to 
be completely changed to be applicable to such targets and a major R and D effort 
is likely to be needed. 
To analyze the application process, we can fi rst list some of the processes and 
steps that are involved. The key processes are:
risk assessments, threats analyses, characterization of system type, statement of 
performance and quality requirements, test and evaluation, choice of instrument 
and calibration.
A well-organized procurement and commissioning process might consist of the fol-
lowing steps 
          1.     Identify the threat.
          2.     Select the sensitive place /process.
          3.     Evaluate the data (throughput, size, etc.)
          4.     Find the right technology.
          5.     Decide the technical requirements (sensitivity, minimum detection 
level etc.)
          6.     Choose one or more EDS meeting the requirements and obtain samples for
evaluation
          7.     Evaluate, test and accept or reject the EDS
          8.     Operation, calibrate and maintain the EDS
In this document we will review some general points, regarding the application 
steps mentioned above, and describe risk assessment and risk management, in-
cluding some of the methods used. We discuss some formal aspects of procure-
ment: the performance parameters of EDS which must be specifi ed in the agreed 
documentation and the main characterization that must be take into account dur-
ing the defi nition process.
1.  INTRODUCTION
Introduction
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Next, we outline the basic quality assurance required of the supplier of EDS and 
some of international and national standards which may apply. We then describe 
the important test and evaluation step, which must be taken during the procure-
ment process. Finally, we discuss the new threats which must nowadays be con-
sidered, together with some improvements of the current methods and equipment 
and technologies which are required to counter these threats. 
Introduction
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2.  RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk Management related to 
security is a systematic, ana-
lytical process to consider the 
likelihood that a threat will 
harm an asset or individuals 
and to identify actions that re-
duce the risk and mitigate the 
consequences of an attack or 
event [6].  The process must 
be systematic and method-
ological to identify the high-
est-probability threats and 
those with the most serious 
consequences, and to evalu-
ate and choose the right sys-
tem and specifi cation for the particular threat faced. Risk management is of key 
importance for focusing the effort of prevention. A decision to deploy EDS should 
only be taken after a comprehensive analysis, as described in this section.
The process may be considered in two parts: Risk Assessment and Action Plan
To establish a formal system for Risk Assessment, fi rst, there is a need to defi ne 
the key terms:
Threat  -       an event or occurrence that can potentially cause harm to an 
individual (person) systems or assets. (A threat is not harmful 
unless/until the potential is realised).
Risks  -       the probability that potential for harm from a threat will be 
realized, considered together with the level of the conse-
quences.
Vulnerabilities -       the weaknesses of a system that must be examined. They 
may be related to personnel, protection systems, processes, 
physical structures. In our paper it can be points that could 
be exploited by terrorists to carry out an attack.
There are some established methods and techniques for collecting and analyzing 
data to perform risk assessment. 
One simple method contains the following steps:  
2.1.1
BASIC RISK
MANAGEMENT METHOD
2.1
RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk management
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•      Risk assessment & intelligence - Threat Assessment; Intelligence collection, 
gathering and dissemination; Data mining. 
•       Protection (site & transport) - Protection from explosives and weapons; 
Physical protection of sensitive sites; Transportation protection; Access con-
trol systems; Protection from CBRN threats
•       Detection, identifi cation & localization - Detection and identifi cation of 
the threatening device or object (explosives, weapons, CBRN, drugs, other 
dangerous goods or whatever it is) ; Scanning; Intrusion detection; People 
identifi cation (biometrics); Detection of sick people, Localization of people, 
vehicles and containers; Detection of abnormal situations and behaviour.
The second method of risk management that we describe has been advocated [6] 
by the Defense Capabilities and Management department of the US Government 
Accountability Offi ce.  It contains the following categories:
•     Threat Assessment 
•     Vulnerability Assessment
•     Criticality Assessment.
For comprehensive risk management, all these assessments have to be done for air, 
ground, and sea scenarios. They may be described in more detail as follows:
•     Threat assessment
A threat assessment is used to evaluate the likelihood of activity against a 
given asset. It  helps to establish and prioritize security-program require-
ments, planning, and resource allocations. A threat assessment can be 
identifi es and evaluates each threat on the basis of various factors, including 
capability, intention, and impact of an attack.
•     Vulnerability assessment
Vulnerability assessment is a process that identifi es weaknesses in physical 
structures, personnel protection systems, processes, or other areas that may 
be exploited by a hostile organization. It may be applied to security systems, 
computer networks, , infrastructure  etc. These assessments are conducted 
by teams of experts skilled in such areas as engineering, intelligence, secu-
rity, information systems, fi nance, and other disciplines. 
•     Criticality assessment
Prioritize for all vulnerable assets which are most important and thus would 
get the highest level of  protection, the factor that have to take into ac-
count are basically: mission and signifi cance of a target importance to com-
munity  security (computer networks), economic activity (Plants, bridges) 
some facilities might be critical at certain times, like large sports stadiums,  
shopping malls.
The following general structure for security analyses was introduced by the ISO 
Advisory Group on Security [10] and has been adopted by CEN BT/WG 161, the CEN 
Working Group on Protection and Security of the Citizen. It is based on a three-
Risk management
2.1.2
THE GAO-DCM 
METHOD
2.1.3
ISO-AGS METHOD
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dimensional model as follows:
•     TARGETS
•     THREATS 
•     COUNTERMEASURES.
A risk management approach can guide preparedness efforts related to every com-
ponent of the threats that have been defi ned. The outputs of such systematic work 
are wide plans of action. The 4P’s Method is a classifi cation used in framing an 
action plan.
Prevent - threat related,
Pursue - person related,
Protect   - target related,
Prepare - operation related.
This categorization originated in the UK [10] and has been recommended for use 
across Europe [5]. The explosive threats that we are dealing with in this report, 
must be detected and identifi ed in wide scenarios, starting with human (suicide 
bombing), material transfer, and end item carrying, in  baggage, mail, contain-
ers  and vehicles. In most of these scenarios, application of explosive detection 
instruments is part of the Prevent topic, as a horizontal activity applied to most 
categories of targets.
Later in 2005 , the Council of the European Union defi ned its Counter Terrorism 
Strategy on the basis of a slightly different four pillar structure: 
Prevent, Protect, Pursue, Respond.
In this structure, Explosives detection is considered to be part of the “Protect” 
pillar, which is defi ned to consist of actions to “protect citizens and infrastructure 
and reduce our vulnerability to attack, including through improved security of 
borders, transport and critical infrastructure” “Prevent” in the Counter Terrorism 
Strategy refers to political and sociological measures to prevent people turning to 
terrorism.
As may be seen from the above descriptions, the various systems for Risk Manage-
ment are all quite similar in concept, each seeking to break down the problem into 
categories into which all the required actions can be placed. The question of the 
relative merits of the different approaches is of secondary importance. The key 
point is that some systematic method should be adopted.
During the process of risk assessment we have to consider and identify all the 
threats. The next step is Risk Analysis and Threat Classifi cation, in which we check 
the likelihood of occurrence of every threat and classify them by their consequence 
and the probability of occurrence. The action priority must be given to those with 
the most probability of  occurring and the most catastrophic consequence. The 
threat probability is simply the likelihood (or perceived likelihood) that a particu-
lar threat will actually take place. The threat consequence is the damage that the 
event would be expected to cause if it did occur, including loss of life, injuries, 
and damage to Property. Both of these aspects have to take into consideration, and 
2.2
THREAT PROBABILITY 
AND THREAT CONSE-
QUENCE
Risk management
2.1.4
THE 4P’S METHOD
2.1.5
EUROPEAN UNION 
COUNTER TERRORISM 
STRATEGY
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they are largely independent.
The important thing in any risk management method is that it needs to be a pro-
cess in which we try to identify and mitigate the highest likelihood threats with 
the most serious consequences, which we call the “Unacceptable Risks”. One ap-
proach is to divide each of the two aspects into three categories to produce fi ve 
overall categories of risk as in Table 1.
Minor
damage
Major
damage
Catastrophic
damage
Low
probability Trivial risk Tolerable Risk Medium Risk
Medium
probability Tolerable Risk Medium Risk Major Risk
High
probability Medium Risk Major Risk
Unacceptable 
Risk 
Table 1:
Risk level
determination 
Risk management
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A detection system is characterized by certain key properties: descriptive state-
ment which defi ne what type of system it is and performance statistics which mea-
sure how well it does its job. Explosives-detection equipment uses qualitative and 
quantitative information extracted from objects within e.g. baggage to determine 
the presence of an explosive threat. If the information extracted was combined to 
represent a single physical parameter, the physical parameter can be thought of 
as a decision variable. The paradigm presupposes a population of explosive threat 
and normal bags that generates a position and spread (or distribution) of the physi-
cal parameter for each population. The overlap of the two populations determines 
the performance of the equipment. To classify the information obtained from the 
equipment, a threshold value of the physical parameter is adopted on which to 
base a decision on the presence of an explosive threat. The threshold value of this 
physical parameter establishes the detection (true-positive fraction) and false-
alarm (false-positive fraction) rates (see table 2). The primary focus of a test and 
evaluation plan should be those aspects of the explosives-detection equipment 
that affect the value of the physical parameters that establish the decision thresh-
old.
(T) Truth
Yes
(explosive 
present)
No
(explosive 
absent)
(D
)
De
te
ct
or
re
ad
in
g Yes a b
No c d
1)    a + b + c + d represents total tests.
2)    a       represents true  positives,
       b       represents false positives,
      c       represents false negatives,
      d       represents true  negatives.
3)   a + c  tests run with explosives present.
4)   b + d tests run with explosives absent.
True positive rate (sensitivity): = Pr(D = Yes | T = Yes) = a/(a + c).
False positive rate: = Pr(D = Yes | T = No)= b/(b + d).
Specifi city: Pr(D = No|T = No) = d/(b + d).
Operating point: b+d >> a+c  in realistic scenarios.
3. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE & CHARACTERIZATION
3.1
PERFORMANCE
PARAMETERS
System Performance & Characterization
Table 2:
Defi nitions of true and 
false positives and 
negatives
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Figure 1:
Probability den-
sity functions of test 
measurement in the 
threatening bags (gray 
curve) and normal 
bag (line  curve). The 
overlap of the two 
populations deter-
mines the perfor-
mance of the equip-
ment.
There are several factors that may contribute to the position and breadth of the 
distribution of a physical parameter, ultimately determining a detection and false-
alarm rate. These contributors include random fl uctuations due to statistical pro-
cesses inherent to data acquisition, artifi cial clutter (noise) resulting from the 
type and orientation of objects within test object, mechanical drifts, physical and 
electronics drifts.
Having conducted the Risk Assessment and concluded that EDS is needed, we have 
to defi ne the technical specifi cation required for the instrument, including the 
quantitative data. The three main factors which must be considered are: type of 
explosive involved, probability of detection and cost of the EDS. In most cases, all 
these elements must be taken into account to get the maximum security with rea-
sonable price. In addition factors of health and safety, public perception, privacy 
and throughput are important.
The ideal EDS would be able to detect any type of explosive. Real EDS are designed 
to detect a limited list of specifi c substances known to be explosive. Even a system 
able to indicate all known explosives, were it to exist, could still be defeated by a 
novel one. There is no detector available which indicates the specifi c properties of 
high energy release, instability and emission of gaseous reaction products. 
We can categorize the explosive types by looking at the historical involvement 
of explosives in terrorist events, taking into account the targets and trying to 
identify the requirements to protect our own vulnerable targets. But variation of 
the chemical behavior is another factor that forces us to make a very systematic 
risk management process to fi nd the changes and improvements of the material 
(threats) we looking for and to consider how they affect the  EDS/s  we use.
3.2
MAIN FACTORS TO BE 
WEIGHED FOR A GIVEN 
APPLICATION
3.2.1
THE EXPLOSIVES & 
TAGGANTS TO BE 
DETECTED AND THE 
DESIRED SENSITIVITY 
LEVELS
System Performance & Characterization
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Table 3:
Detection agents used 
in plastic explosives
Figure 2:
Summary of explosives
used in the past (1)
(SOURCE: U.S. Depart-
ment of Treasury, 
1996)
If we consider the vapor pressure as a single example of a parameter affecting the 
EDS, then it is evident that there is very big variation between explosives in this 
characteristic. In addition to detection of explosives themselves, also important 
is the ability to detect explosives which have been tagged to make them easier to 
fi nd. Table 3 lists some examples. 
System cost is often a major factor in determining what sort of explosives de-
tection system to purchase. Depending on the type of system and the degree of 
sophistication that is desired, commercial detection systems can range from ap-
proximately $20,000 to greater than $1 million in cost. It is often necessary to 
choose between the purchase of one very sophisticated system and the purchase of 
several cheaper and less sophisticated ones. Maintenance costs must be factored 
in when determining total system cost. Several maintenance plans are available 
from the various detection systems manufacturers, ranging from a per call to a 
scheduled preventative maintenance option. Maintenance costs can vary depend-
ing upon the complexity of the system, number of systems at a particular location, 
and the specifi c plan chosen. These costs can be as high as 10 percent of the origi-
nal system cost on a yearly basis.
If the application will involve screening people for explosives, then the potential 
health effects of the screening process need to be taken into account. Even if it is 
demonstrable that there is no real hazard to human health, the public perception 
3.2.2
SYSTEM COST
3.2.3
HEALTH/PUBLIC
SAFETY ISSUES
System Performance & Characterization
[13]  (Sources: The Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detec-
tion, signed in Montreal in 1991, available from the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion, Committee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosives et al., 1998).
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that there is a problem may present a signifi cant barrier to the use of a technol-
ogy. The prototypical example is the use of personnel screening systems that use 
low-dose X-ray technology to detect bombs and other contraband items. While the 
X-ray dosages involved are trivial, the general public dread of X-rays has thus far 
limited the use of such systems. In some places in the world  these systems have 
been restricted primarily to use in correctional facilities, where the inmates or 
persons visiting inmates are screened. In these applications, there is essentially a 
captive audience that has little choice but to submit to the screening process. For 
wider applications, extensive education of the public may be necessary before the 
technology can be applied.
Equipment for detection of explosives may give rise to issues of privacy because 
of the connection between innocuous true positives and passenger medical status 
(presence of prostheses, implants, pharmaceutical nitroglycerine etc.), the second 
issue that may cause privacy problems is that some new methods and technologies 
give “naked” pictures of  the passenger that is being checked, (low dose x –ray, 
acoustic & millimeter  wave technologies).
  Figure 3               Figure 4a                                     Figure 4b
One high-volume application is inspection of passengers in aviation and mass trans-
portation stations. Achieving adequate throughput rate is, in fact, one of the most 
important problems that need to be solved by using EDS i.e. the EDS is useful if it 
is faster than hand-search. We can defi ne throughput as the rate that the objects 
pass the screen such as passengers per hour through a portal (gate) or number of 
luggage items per hour in an X-ray machine. When the required throughput rate is 
very high, two or more systems with different characteristic may be employed to-
gether to achieve the rate overall, but reducing the performance at some points.
Figure 3:
X-ray explosives 
detection  system for 
personnel
(Rapiscan Secure 
1000)
Figure 4:
Wideband (27 - 33 
GHz) image of a man 
with a thin sheet of 
simulated plastic 
explosive between his 
shoulder blades. (a) 
Optical picture (b) 
Millimetres-wave im-
age.[8]
3.2.4
PRIVACY & DETECTION 
PROCESS
3.2.5
SYSTEM SPEED 
(THROUGHPUT RATE)
System Performance & Characterization
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Example: luggage can be speed-screened in a high-rate X-ray machine which we 
allow to have a relatively high false alarm rate, and only suspect luggage from 
the fi rst stage undergoes inspection in a high resolution low-rate X-ray machine 
or other EDS, with low false alarm rate. The same approach could be applied to a 
trace machine for passengers in the aviation application.
Once the application of explosives detection has been identifi ed, there are a num-
ber of factors that need to be weighed in determining what sort of detection sys-
tem to acquire. One of these is, of course the cost, which is assessed in relation 
to the qualities of the system. Trace systems may cost anything between $5,000-
$100,000, depending on the technology and the sensitivity, the average cost being 
between $40.000 and $75.000.
Defi ning the characterization is a basic step for the overall specifi cation before we 
can choose and evaluate the candidate EDS. For example, we can categorize the 
characterization of a trace system according to the following groups [3]: 
Mechanical Operational Maintenance and Calibration Legal issues Safety
System Size ExplosivesDetected Maintenance Admissibility Radioactivity
Weight NuisanceAlarm Rate Calibration
Detection Limits 
Probability
of Detection 
Ruggedness 
Field Power
Operation 
Start-up Time 
Sample
Collection Mode 
Sample
Collection Time 
Sample
Analysis Time
Ease of Use
Alarm andUser 
Notifi cation
False
Positive Rate
Data storage and 
transfer
Drug Detection 
3.3
DEFINING SYSTEM 
CHARACTERIZATIONS 
System Performance & Characterization
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These characteristics need to be defi ned on a quantative basis because defi nitions 
like  “easy carrying by one  person” are open to misunderstanding.
(1)  System Size:  L* W* H  limits the capability of the system to be handled  
(2)   System Weight: For example, an instrument consisting of one piece with a 
weight of about 10kg  (or two pieces of 5 kg) could generally be feasibly car-
ried by one operator without risk of dropping.
(1)   Explosives Detected: The system can detect all the type of explosive as de-
scribed at section 3.2, explosive and taggant. Of course, this is a wide defi ni-
tion and, when we need to give the specifi cation, it should be refi ned to take 
into account the level of security in the area and any other measures specifi c 
to the problem at hand that need to be taken care of. The explosives that are 
most often stated in specifi cations as being required to be detected are :  TNT, 
RDX, PETN, NG, EGDN, DNT, ANFO (ammonium nitrate), double base smokeless 
and black powders, and common taggants such as DMDNB and mononitrotolu-
enes. It is important to remember that, not all the explosives will be detected 
at the same sensitivities by the same EDS, because their chemical properties 
vary.
(2)   Nuisance Alarm Rate: is when the EDS gives a true alarm, but because of in-
nocuous contamination of the operator, who handles or works with ammuni-
tion or explosive before starting the work with the EDS. The recommended ac-
ceptable alarm rate could be, for example, between 1 percent and 5 percent, 
depend on the contamination  level of the operator before using the EDS. This 
can be defi ned in the specifi cation. 
(3)   Detection Limits: these  should  specify  the minimum quantity of explosive or 
taggant that we would like to fi nd, with a certain level of confi dence, usually 
limited to 95-99 percent. A typical minimum would be the amount that can 
be found in fi ngerprints: 70-100 μ gram. The surface of the object that it is 
planned to check may also come in to the picture.
(4)   Probability of Detection: the requirement should be specifi ed as a percentage, 
usually expected to be between 95 percent 99 percent for a swiped fi ngerprint 
or other swipe from hard or soft surfaces. (See par.3.1 ).
(5)   Ruggedness: the specifi cation should include the environmental conditions 
that the EDS can withstand during its life cycle. It should include at least the 
following: 
        - Transportation – both in its packing case and out, and the kind of case.
        - Shocks- defi nition of the condition depends on the use of the EDS. 
        - Temperature-range for continuous use and max. and min. for short-time peaks.
        - Dust and humidity – defi nition depending on the planned use
(6)   Field Power Operation: Mains, depending on country (220 v 50 Hz./ 110v 60 
Hz) and, if necessary, battery operation and 12/24 DC for use in a car, with or 
without a converter.. All these options can be carefully reviewed for the best 
(and minimum needed) requirements, according to the planned use of the 
instrument .
3.3.1
MECHANICAL
3.3.2
OPERATIONAL
System Performance & Characterization
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(7)   Start-up Time: this characteristic depends on the operational method of use 
of the EDS and the place of operation. The time to start from both cold and 
warm states should be considered. If it is too long, a lot of time can be wasted 
in operation. This requirement can force us to consider the full plan for opera-
tion during a very early stage of the specifi cation process,
(8)   Sample Collection Mode: Swipe methods can be used for most types of explo-
sive on most surfaces.Vacuum collection is useful for surfaces such as cloth-
ing. 
(9)   Sample Collection Time: the time needed to collect the sample varies between 
seconds and a few minutes, depending how many samples are needed and the 
object being checked.
(10)  Sample Analysis Time: after the sample collection , the time for the system to 
analyze the sample and give its result, typically between 30s and 2 minutes. 
It is usually short compared to the sample collection time and so not the 
bottleneck.
(11)  Ease of Use: The operation of a particular system can sometimes need the 
manufacturer’s involvement for a period of training before use.  If this is un-
acceptable in the context, this should be stated in the specifi cation that the 
operator will not have any training and an average person should easily be 
able to operate the system.
(12)  Alarm and User Notifi cation of Detection: systems are designed to give an in-
dication of a detection event that can be audio, visual alarm, spectrum detail 
or other. The explosive type or general information about the type is shown 
by some systems.
(13)  False Positive Rate: The rate is generally less than 5 percent during test in the 
laboratory. Two kinds of false positive need to be distinguished: those intrinsic 
to the instrument and those caused by response to innocuous but explosive-
like materials. 
  
(14)  Data Storage and transfer: the data of the system can be printed and/or 
logged electronically. In defi ning the specifi cation, consideration should be 
given to how convenient it will be to transfer the EDS data to other systems 
in use by the organization.
(15)  Drug Detection: Some types of EDS also have a capability to detect narcot-
ics. A requirement for this feature depends on the general management and 
context of the security system. It will vary from a minimum of no need for any 
capability to detect drugs to a maximum of a need for a capability of detec-
tion of all the common kinds, such as cocaine, heroine and marijuana. 
(1)    Maintenance interval: systems need maintenance; the interval for preventive 
treatment should be defi ned, including down time and the time to obtain 
spares if needed.
(2)    System Calibration: the calibration process should be defi ned by the manufac-
turer with a written procedure that can be performed by trained staff. The 
3.3.3
MAINTENANCE
System Performance & Characterization
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need for calibration may be due to specifi c events like: change of weather, 
cases of contamination with explosive, change of location, or another envi-
ronmental condition. A minimum of once a day calibration can be a reason-
able requirement of such an instrument.
        Admissibility: the system should have the ability to provide admissible evi-
dence in court. This ability can probably be achieved by a few conditions: 
certifi cation of the method and procedures with an international or national 
calibration system or certifi cation system (ISO 17025 or similar). Data records 
of the validation process have to kept and presented when needed as a basis 
for validating the results of the instrument.
        Radioactivity: the presence of radioactive material in some types of explosive 
detection device is a serious concern, because of possible risk to the public, 
the environment and especially the operator who works continuously with it. 
The instrument must comply with relevant national regulations and there may 
be some legal paperwork required during the life cycle of the instrument to 
document this.
3.3.5
SAFETY
3.3.4
LEGAL ISSUES
System Performance & Characterization
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During the life cycle of  EDS the requirements for standardization are very impor-
tant and include at least the following steps:
First:   Quality assurance system of the industry involved.
Second: Specifi cation and R&D process. 
Third:  Evaluation and qualifi cation specifi cation.
Fourth:   Requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories 
during their life cycle
Explosive Detection equipment is generally approved case by case according to the 
manufacturer / industry . The two last steps are sometimes classifi ed, depending 
on the security measures taken by the related body involved (police,security ser-
vices, civil aviation authorities etc.) 
The other key actors are the standards organizations, national, regional and inter-
national. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is described as 
follows in [9]:
 “a global network that identifi es what International Standards are required 
by business, government and society, develops them in partnership with the 
sectors that will put them to use, adopts them by transparent procedures 
based on national input and delivers them to be implemented worldwide. 
They make transparent the requirements that products must meet on world 
markets, as well as the conformity assessment mechanisms for checking that 
those products measure up to standards. As a result, suppliers from developed 
and developing countries alike can compete on an equal basis on markets ev-
erywhere. Its members are not, as is the case in the United Nations system, 
delegations of national governments. Nevertheless, ISO occupies a special po-
sition between the public and private sectors. This is because, on the one 
hand, many of its member institutes are part of the governmental structure 
of their countries, or are mandated by their government. On the other hand, 
other members have their roots uniquely in the private sector, having been set 
up by national partnerships of industry associations”.
The European related organization is CEN- European Committee for Standardization 
which contributes to the objectives of the European Union and European Economic 
Area with voluntary technical standards which promote free trade, the safety of 
workers and consumers, interoperability of networks, environmental protection, 
exploitation of research and development programmers, and public procurement. 
CEN works closely with the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardiza-
tion (CENELEC), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), and 
ISO.
4.  STANDARDS & QUALITY
4.1 
KEY ACTORS
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The basic regulations established by the EU for aviation security are:
Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 December 2002 establishing common rules in the fi eld of civil aviation security, 
(O.J. L355 of 30.12.2002)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2003 of 4 April 2003 laying down measures for 
the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation security, (O.J. L89 
of 5.4.2003). 
Regulations 2320 and 622 contain detailed requirements as regards the perfor-
mance of the screening equipment to be used and the methodology. In this fi eld, 
standards and test protocols have been established in close cooperation with the 
European Civil Aviation Conference, which regroups experts from the appropriate 
authorities of the Member States and other European States. Furthermore, the 
Commission is regularly in close contact with the industry and other stake hold-
ers concerned (Stakeholders Advisory Group on Aviation Security – SAGAS Group), 
which is an effort to focus investment on standardization, research, certifi cation 
and interoperability of detection systems and to transform research results into 
useful and applicable tools.
In addition to these European laws and to the international standards for the pro-
cess of  R&D and production -the European Commission published a Green Paper on 
detection technologies in the work of law enforcement, customs and other security 
authorities detection technologies for law enforcement authorities COM(2006) 474 
that aims to fi nd out what role the Union could play in order to foster detection 
technologies in the service of the security of its citizens. It recognized that more 
development is needed in quality assurance in Europe and states 
“However, very often it is diffi cult to identify what tools and products are the best 
or at least meet certain minimum requirements. An EU-wide system of certifying 
good quality tools and benchmarking them, designed to simplify the process of 
establishing which of the tools or equipment can meet the particular needs of a 
particular authority, could address this defi cit.”
In the US, the Food and Drugs Administration must approve any instrument that 
is applied to humans or to food items, including those in luggage. Active EDS is 
affected by this, so the manufacturer must meet the FDA’s requirements. In par-
ticular, The FDA generally requires compliance with the US Good Manufacturing 
Practice (GMP) Regulation, which goes beyond the ISO standard.
Equipment has to meet two major requirements:
(1)   Quality assurance during the design and production,
(2)   Validation Certifi cation process.
The basic quality requirements for production of equipment involved with food or 
the human body include the main topics:
(1)   Meeting the requirements of the ISO standard,
(2)   Identifi cation of device as well as manufacturing process specifi cations,
4.2
SITUATION IN EUROPE
4.3
SITUATION IN US
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(3)   Validation of device design and manufacturing processes, 
(4)   Documented control of device manufacturing processes, 
(5)   Feedback on the quality management program through in-process and fi nal 
device inspection and testing, device complaints (e.g., internal, customers, 
regulatory), and audits (e.g., internal, customer, regulatory). 
The attractive feature of applying the GMP regulation to the manufacture of explo-
sives-detection equipment is that it would allow the FAA or other federal agency 
to monitor progress of the design, development, and manufacture processes. Fur-
thermore, use of the GMP regulation would allow for feedback regarding existing 
and potential problems early in the development and manufacturing cycle. This 
would enable corrective action, resulting in higher-quality product and a more-
reliable manufacturing processes. 
Standards & Quality
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Compliance with the specifi cation agreed by the buyer and manufacturer should 
be proved during the performance test and evaluation process, to measure the 
effectiveness of the EDS under normal conditions including all the environmental 
specifi cations mentioned.
Performance in some of the extreme conditions may be tested for a short time 
(max. and min. temp etc.). The working conditions need to be recorded during all 
the test. The environment that the equipment will work in when it is in service 
should be the base for the evaluation test. 
It is highly recommended that the following characteristics are included in such an 
evaluation process:
  - Throughput rate in a real working demonstration.
  - Explosive-type detection tests and sensitivity. 
  - Reliability, false alarm (false negative and false positive data). 
The contamination performance should be demonstrated using a specimen of a 
real item.
An important study of the performance of EDS in realistic scenarios was presented 
and undertaken by the Transport Research Board of the US National Academies 
[1]. Real time testing was done, with data collected at a combination trolley, bus, 
intercity-rail and commuter rail stop; and a combination intercity-rail and bus 
stop. The data collection period included peak-hour commuting. There needed to 
be a clear distinction among the baggage categories because of the wide variety 
of items included in each.  Two test objects were used for trace detection instru-
ments: 
  - Luggage handle
  - Luggage zip fastner
Results, shown in Tables 4 and 5 give a good example of a format for summary 
of data collected during a fi eld trial. In this case, the results indicate that the 
instrument’s performance was poor.
5.1 
FIELD-OPERATIONA 
TESTING DESCRIPTION
5.2
RESULTS OF TESTS –
EXAMPLE DESCRIPTION
5.  TEST & EVALUATION
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Calibration is the comparison of an instrument’s performance to a standard of 
known accuracy. The result of a calibration may be documentation showing the de-
viation of a measurement from the known standard or it may also include adjusting 
the instrument’s measurement capability to improve measurement accuracy.
Explosive detection equipment is one of the most sensitive and most highly sophis-
ticated detection technologies implemented. Its adjustment may be delicate and 
it may require frequent re-calibration to ensure reliability of the results.
Calibration is especially important for trace detection equipment where the pres-
ence of explosive is indicated by a small change of a signal with respect to a back-
ground. Calibration of the detection instrument is made by using an independently 
calibrated sample of a known explosive and checking that the results returned 
by the instrument agree with the known concentration or mass of the sample. If 
there is any deviation, corrective action or maintenance of the equipment must 
be performed.  Repetition of the calibration measurement is used to reduce er-
rors, as a rule, the test should be repeated for every explosive at least twice. For 
example, in an IMS instrument, calibration allows the instrument to adjust the 
Table 5:
False negative test
results analysis ex-
ample
Test & Evaluation
Table 4:
Example of trace 
detection test results 
[1]
5.3
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present values of the mobility (or drift) time to the current conditions. Some IMS 
explosives detectors have built-in materials and software to automatically perform 
calibration.  
Manufacturers of explosives detectors often provide calibration samples, for ex-
ample, in the form of sampling pads that have been spiked with known amounts 
of certain explosives. There must be a sample for every explosive type that the 
equipment specifi cation indicates. Calibration samples may also be available from 
industry  laboratories such as Advanced Aviation Technology Ltd. Surrey, UK  and 
Sigma –Aldrich Inc. The minimum concentration normally available is 10 nano grams 
per micro liter (10mg/l), corresponding to 25ml of solution containing 0.25mg of 
the target substance. Different substances and concentrations are available on 
request for calibrating chemical-based methods. 
For bulk explosive systems like X-ray and nuclear methods, because of the safety 
problem of using samples of real explosive material in bulk, innocuous “simulant 
materials” that have similar detection properties to the explosive may be used 
for calibration. It should be mentioned that, in addition to the machine calibra-
tion, there is a human factor that is not perfectly defi ned because many systems 
do not alarm automatically and require a person to determine whether a threat 
item is present on a display screen. Stored images showing bombs or weapons can 
be shown on the screen at random intervals to ensure that the operator remains 
alert.
Calibration measurements for X-ray systems include those using a step wedge. The 
step wedge as defi ned by the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) 
is a series of steps of aluminum with a series of thin wires of various gauges at-
tached beneath. The purpose of this test device is to determine that the system 
can produce different distinct image intensity levels for each step while clearly 
displaying the smallest specifi ed wire beneath each step. Typical X-ray systems 
can image a minimum of 34AWG solid copper wire through a minimum of 10 steps. 
Many modern systems can perform at higher levels,  tests with 38AWG and 20 steps 
are common.
Test & Evaluation
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Recent events have shown that terrorists are using new methods of operation. 
Terrorists operating today are better organized, more professional and better 
equipped than their predecessors of the past.  A risk assessment process should 
take into account that there is high probability of further novelties in the future. 
This presents a big challenge for R&D in detection systems and technology.  We list 
here some of new terrorist threats and suggest possible goals which EDS develop-
ment programs might seek to reach for.
•    Development  of new explosives- new chemical explosives that do not utilize 
nitrogen and have very low vapor pressures, 
•    Operation method – without wiring or electronic devices. (For example, KINEPAK 
a new high explosive that is created when two non-explosive components are 
mixed) (Fig. 1)
•    Operation methods that do not include any metal parts
•    Operation methods that hide all explosives under clothing.(Fig.2)
Weapons of mass destruction. Examples have already been seen of chemical and 
biological attacks by terrorists.
•    The method and equipment should be more made effective, in the sense of 
achieving more true detections for fewer false alarms. 
•    Dual or multisensor technology should be developed, on the principle of or-
thogonal detection, (two or more EDS technologies are considered completely 
orthogonal if the detection methods detect independent characteristics of the 
explosive device). This will give a higher probability of detecting explosives 
over a range of potential threats and will give greater effectiveness in detect-
ing explosives than any single technology.
•    Systems of real-time integration and decision making are needed. Methods that 
automate recognition are preferred i.e., the decision to select a suspicious bag 
for further investigation is performed without human intervention, because 
inspecting many pieces is a repetitive and boring task of which humans (and 
even dogs) quickly tire.
•    Security should be increased but without increasing the delay or the control 
time.
•    However, threat alarm thresholds should be decreased where appropriate.
6. NEW THREATS AND EDS IMPROVEMENT NEED 
New threats and EDS improvement need
6.1 
NEW THREATS 
6.2
GOALS FOR IMPROVE-
MENT OF CURRENT 
EDS: A WISH-LIST 
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•    The speed with which the detection is performed is a crucial factor when a po-
tential threat develops rapidly. The control times that will be possible in some 
scenarios are very limited e.g. suicide bombings. Stand off detection is needed 
for higher speed.
•    In cases where a human is involved (such as a suicide bomber), psychological 
and physiological methods can be considered for operation together with EDS.
•    Automated trace sampling hardware (sampling methods that cover only a small 
portion of the bag surface for acquisition of adequate residues for analysis), 
detect only a specifi c list of explosives and cannot easily be reconfi gured to 
detect an expanded list of explosives.
•    New technologies with higher chemical specifi city that are capable of detect-
ing a wide range of explosive, chemical, and biological threat materials are 
needed.
•    Low-cost systems are needed using the existing techniques mass-spectrometry 
or ion mobility spectrometry that can detect a range of threat materials.
•    A vapor-based  system, which would sample the air surrounding the package 
without touching it would also be very valuable.
•    EDS should be integrated with, or at least operable with, detectors for chemical 
and biological threats.
Figure 5 Figure 6
New threats and EDS improvement need
Figure 5:
Two components explo-
sive
Figure 6:
Explosives under clothing
Application of Explosive 
Detection Systems
Steps for Fielding 33
In this paper we have surveyed some steps regarding application and fi elding of 
explosive detection systems. We discussed the characteristics of the system which 
must be considered when procuring it, in order to be sure that the system will fi t 
our requirements and can be smoothly fi elded.
We reviewed some basic methods of risk assessment that can be used for any se-
curity fi eld and, in particular, are applicable to the process of fi elding an EDS. The 
risk assessment process must consider the scenario, the known existing threats and 
any new threats that have arisen or which could occur in the future, such as new 
explosive targets and new methods of delivery and use. 
The new threats, and the weaknesses of current systems and methods, need to be 
reviewed during the process of risk assessment and decision making for future R&D 
and purchase. In some cases, new threats need to be taken into account in the 
development process. An astute decision at this stage can provide very important 
benefi ts for a small investment. 
Quality assurance at the production company is based on the specifi cation of the 
system that defi nes all the technical parameters. These should be recognized and 
agreed with the buyer because they are an important part of the implementation 
of the security system. The end-product quality is measured against them. The key 
technical characteristics have to be carefully determined and the technical speci-
fi cation very precise defi ned to allow it to be a basic document for the purchase 
and fi elding of the system.
We mention the main parameters that should be defi ned by the customer during 
the process: the explosives that need to detected by the system, the required 
sensitivity, maximum tolerable false alarm rate, throughput rate and cost. Privacy 
and health and safety issues may also need to be considered.
During the purchase process, demonstration and fi eld test and evaluation are con-
ducted to ensure that development and production has met the requirements. At 
this stage too, the specifi cation document is the key point of reference, defi ning 
the parameters and values that are to be checked. 
Finally, we describe some of the new threats that are emerging and how EDS might 
be developed to meet them.
7. SUMMARY 
Summary
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8. GLOSSARY
Bulk explosives detection system
An EDS which detects a solid mass of explosive material, including indirectly by 
means of the presence or ratio of one or more chemical elements. A bulk detection 
system will not usually detect explosives if only a residue is present.
CBRN
Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear, used to describe a weapon or 
threat.
Comité Européen de Normalisation (CEN)
The European Committee for Standardization, was founded in 1961 by the national 
standards bodies in the European Economic Community and EFTA countries.
Certifi cation
A process through which an EDS is tested and, if it performs successfully, will be 
approved for a certain application.
ECAC
European Civil Aviation Conference, or Conférence Européenne de l’Aviation Civile 
(CEAC) is an international organization with close ties to the United Nations, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, Council of Europe and the institutions of 
the European Union.
EDS
Explosive detection system is a means of detecting the presence of explosives, 
in either trace or bulk quantities, typically employing some combination of elec-
tronic sensors, software and/or chemical reagents. Sniffer dogs or other animals 
may also be considered part of an EDS.
FAA
Federal Aviation Administration, an agency of the United States Department of 
Transportation with authority to regulate and oversee all aspects of civil aviation 
in the U.S.
False alarm
Any alarm of an EDS which occurs when no explosive material or explosive residue 
is really present. It can be caused by chemically similar compounds, or by a defi -
ciency of the system.
False negative
An indication from an EDS that there is no explosive material in an item, when in 
fact some is present.
False positive
An indication from an EDS that there is explosive material in an item, when in fact 
none is present.
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ISO
A network of the national standards institutes of 157 countries, on the basis of 
one  member per country, with a Central Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland, that 
coordinates the system.
Probability of detection
Te probability that a certain explosives detection system (EDS) can detect a cer-
tain amount of a given type of explosive under a particular set of conditions. of 
course that the probability need to determined  based on number of test during 
the development stage and the evaluation process. 
Threat
Event or occurrence that can potentially cause harm to an individual (person), 
systems or assets. (The threat itself is not harmful).
Threat probability
The likelihood of a particular threat event actually occurring, on a scale of 0 
percent (no probability of occurring) to 100 percent (certainty that the event will 
occur).
Throughput rate
The rate at which an EDS can process the objects being screened. It is generally 
expressed in units such as objects per hour.
Trace detection
EDS in which the explosive material is detected from vapor or from particulate 
residue. 
Two-part explosives
Explosives that consist of two separate components, which are sold as a unit in 
separate containers and need to be mixed together prior to detonation.
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Abstract
In this paper we have surveyed some steps regarding application and fi elding of 
explosive detection systems. We discussed the characteristics of the system which 
must be considered when procuring it, in order to be sure that the system will fi t 
our requirements and can be smoothly fi elded.
We reviewed some basic methods of risk assessment that can be used for any se-
curity fi eld and, in particular, are applicable to the process of fi elding an EDS. The 
risk assessment process must consider the scenario, the known existing threats and 
any new threats that have arisen or which could occur in the future, such as new 
explosive targets and new methods of delivery and use. 
The new threats, and the weaknesses of current systems and methods, need to be 
reviewed during the process of risk assessment and decision making for future R&D 
and purchase. In some cases, new threats need to be taken into account in the 
development process. An astute decision at this stage can provide very important 
benefi ts for a small investment. 
Quality assurance at the production company is based on the specifi cation of the 
system that defi nes all the technical parameters. These should be recognized and 
agreed with the buyer because they are an important part of the implementation 
of the security system. The end-product quality is measured against them. The key 
technical characteristics have to be carefully determined and the technical speci-
fi cation very precisely defi ned to allow it to be a basic document for the purchase 
and fi elding of the system.
We mention the main parameters that should be defi ned by the customer during 
the process: the explosives that need to detected by system, the required sensi-
tivity, maximum tolerable false alarm rate, throughput rate and cost. Privacy and 
health and safety issues may also need to be considered.
During the purchase process, demonstration and fi eld test and evaluation are con-
ducted to ensure that development and production has met the requirements. At 
this stage too, the specifi cation document is the key point of reference, defi ning 
the parameters and values that are to be checked.
Finally, we describe some of the new threats that are emerging and how EDS might 
be developed to meet them.
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